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Abstract 
This paper examines Palestine’s foreign policy under Hamas’s Government (2006-2013). The aim is to explore 
the major principles underpinning the formulation of its foreign policy. Data were collected through face-to-face 
interview with five key persons in Hamas, secondary data were collected from books, journals, newspapers, 
magazines, and other relevant resources. The analysis was done through descriptive-analytical method. The 
findings revealed that Hamas foreign policies were formulated based on six agenda, namely: Islamic ethics, 
strategic vision, supporting of the resistance, protection of the national interests, non-interference, and 
independency of decision. Resistance has remained the only means of struggle against the occupation. These 
principles would be critically measured and contextually analyzed to see the implications towards the protection 
of Palestinians and the Hamas interests. 
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1. Introduction 
Foreign policies that are formulated in any country should be capable protecting its national interests. It consists 
of strategies to safeguard national interests and to achieve goals within its international relations (Nye & 
Keohane, 1971). It is one of the wheels which underpin the process of international politics. Every nation has its 
own right to formulate its own strategies in its foreign policy formulation (see, Joshi & Srivastava, 2005 and 
Beasley & Kaarbo, 2012). Such strategies could involve military power, land defense, technology and ideology 
in the context of individual nation interests. It is a primary concern of any nation is to have the foreign policy 
consistent to its national interests. This reality also applies to the Palestinian state under Hamas led government. 
The Hamas led government came into power after a landslide victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections 
on January 2006 (see, Scham & Abu-Irshaid, 2009 and Abu-Helal, 2014).  
It is important to bear in mind that Hamas holds a key role in the Palestinian politics, just as a hard 
number that cannot be bypassed in any politics equation. Some studies in the Palestinian politics and 
international relations seem to have only focused on the pretext against Hamas of being a government that 
supports resistance and being against Quartet conditions (Saleh, 2013; Zweiri, 2006). Others have focused on 
Hamas’ commitments to its initial goals and demands (Abu-Helal, 2014; Lovlie & Knudsen, 2013). What are not 
yet clear are the Hamas foreign policy objectives in advancing the course of Palestinian national interests. This 
study was carried out the measure Hamas foreign policies in the context of Palestinian national interest during 
the period of 2006-2013. This paper is based on research conducted with a qualitative approach based on case 
study method to collect data through interviews. A total of five key persons in Hamas Government were 
interviewed (the Prime Minister, two ministers from Foreign Affairs, a head of foreign relations, and one scholar 
in Palestinian studies). 
 
2. Historical Overview 
Hamas is an acronym for an Arabic term, Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya or the Islamic Resistance 
Movement in English translation, and an acronym for the Arabic ‘zeal’ or ‘fervour’ (Zuhur, 2008; Barsky & 
Committee, 2006; Abu-Amr, 1993). This movement started with the first Intifada (a Palestinian first uprising 
against the Israeli occupation) in 1987 and followed by the formal Hamas’ formation in 1988 to develop new 
effective techniques in resisting the Israeli occupation. Hamas describes itself as a Palestinian national liberation 
movement that struggles for the liberation of the Palestinian occupied territories and for the recognition of the 
legitimate rights of Palestinians (Hroub, 2009; 2007). For that reason, Hamas is considered the most prominent 
movement that represents the Islamic ideological line of the Palestinian. Shortly after its inception, the 
Movement defined itself as a “wing of Palestinian Muslim Brothers” (El-Hamad & Al-Bargothi, 2010; Scham & 
Abu-Irshaid, 2009; Levitt, 2008). Hamas’ representatives then declared that “the Islamic Resistance Movement 
is the armed wing for the Society of the Muslim Brothers” (Gunning, 2004; Charter, 1988). 
The 1990s witnessed many treaties between Fatah the ruling party of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and 
Israel. These treaties resulted only in legitimizing the Israeli occupation on most of the Palestinian lands (Khalidi, 
1991). Since the signature of the Oslo Accords in September 1993 between Fatah and Israel mainly to recognise 
each other, Hamas had been in opposition against it (Saleh, 2014). During this period, the main thrust of Hamas’ 
activities was in social, charitable, educational, and political programs aimed for the Palestinians. Based on such 
focus, Hamas has been a refuge for many of those Palestinians who against the Oslo initiative (Zuhur, 2008). 
Over time, the Oslo accords crumbled, due to the increasing strife between Fatah and Hamas. At the same time, 
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ordinary Palestinians began to support Hamas more strongly (Saleh, 2014). 
Hamas’ resistance continued during the Oslo years from 1993 until 2000, when the Second Intifada 
erupted. Until the upsurge of the second Intifada, Hamas’ popularity, as indicated by repeated public polls, never 
exceeded that of Fatah. Things changed after the second Intifada which was followed by the Palestinian local 
and national elections in 2005/2006 [the election of Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in 25 January 2006] 
(Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010).  In that election, Hamas shocked the world by winning a landslide victory, 
which meant putting the permanently ill-fated peace process to an end (Abu-Amr, 2007; Hroub, 2006).  Hamas 
won the majority of the seats in the PLC in its first participation in the national elections. Based on the 
Palestinian Basic law, President Mahmud ‘Abbas assigned Hamas leader Isma‘il Haniyyah to form the 
government after consultations with the Reform and Change Bloc, which formed the parliament’s majority 
(Abu-Helal, 2014). For the first time in its history, the Palestinian government is set to be led by the Hamas party 
(Pina, 2006). 
Following the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, the Palestinian’s schism due to the struggles 
between the Fatah and Hamas movements as well as the geographical division in the PA administration between 
Ramallah and Gaza Strip paralyzed the PLO institutions. Hamas had then functioned as the de facto ruler in the 
Gaza Strip, forming an alternative Hamas Government in Gaza. Consequently, the Israelis imposed a siege on 
the GS since 2007 as a collective punishment on its people and carried out two military operations in 2008/2009 
and 2012 to undermine the resisting factions there.  
As such, the Palestinian course was going through a crucial time in history due to the successive events 
in the region (Manna', 2013). Nonetheless, the outcomes of the Arab Spring, in addition to the Israeli acts of 
organized terrorism against the Palestinian people and the massacres it has brought in its wake, led to more 
disastrous circumstances in which the Gaza people had to suffer (Khalidi, 2007). The miseries dispensed on the 
Gaza people also included acts against humanity in Palestinian cities, villages, and refugee camps, in addition to 
the unjust siege imposed on the stubbornly steadfast people of the GS (Al-Kaddoumi, 2014).Hamas rose as a 
major player in the Palestinian arena after it played an essential role and won the legislative elections 2006. It led 
the Palestinian government in the Gaza Strip, successfully thwarted the Israeli aggression on the Strip, and 
maintained great popularity both inside and outside Palestine (Saleh, 2014). A new phase that was started in the 
history of Palestinian governments lasted until March 2013, despite being an interim government (Abu-Helal, 
2014). 
 
3. The External Policies of Hamas 
Hamas' early international relations started late in 1992, after it developed good political stature and influential 
popularity base as well as a reasonable Arab and Islamic relations. However, Hamas' relations with foreign 
countries were still in their infancy. This can be attributed to the subjective reasons that were related to the 
Movement itself as well as the objective reasons that were connected with the position of each foreign country 
(El-Hamad & Al-Bargothi, 2010).By developing relations with the Arab and Islamic countries, Hamas aimed at 
establishing its presence in the Arab political scene, obtaining official recognition and understanding of its 
viewpoints, opening new horizons for its political activities and, finally, gaining material and moral support for 
the Palestinian people’s struggles. Having a firm belief that the Palestinian issue is an Arab and Islamic concern 
in essence, Hamas adopted, certain policies which emphasized cooperation with the Arab and Islamic countries 
indiscriminately to serve the common cause, regardless of political systems or ideological backgrounds (El-
Hamad & Al-Bargothi, 2010; Carroll, 2005). 
Hamas also insisted on non-interference in the internal affairs of any countries and refused any 
interference on its own. It also committed itself to the principle that the scene of the conflict with Israel was 
limited to the Palestinian territories. It refused the policy of conflicting poles and axes (El-Hamad & Al-Bargothi, 
2010). Likewise, Misha'al (2012) states, “We will not intervene in the affairs of other countries and we will not 
engage in discussions, conflicts or alliances with other nations. We have adopted the policy of opening up to the 
different countries of the world, especially the Arab and Islamic countries.”  
In building political relations with the foreign countries, Hamas aimed at projecting itself very clearly 
and directly to such countries so as to correct the tarnished image portrayed by the media. It also strived to find 
supporters in these countries, avoiding foreign measures against it, gaining some representations abroad, and 
obtaining political and material support for its struggle against the occupation. In so doing, Hamas endeavored to 
communicate and cooperate with all countries regardless of their political or ideological backgrounds. 
Additionally, it was anxious to avoid transferring the scene of the conflict into foreign countries or to create 
enmity with any foreign powers. Instead, Hamas sought to partake in any international effort that aims at 
supporting the Palestinian people (El-Hamad & Al-Bargothi, 2010). 
After positioning itself as an important part of the Palestinian political scene, Hamas decided to move 
onto the outside world and establish political relations with the neighboring countries in order to introduce itself 
to these neighbors (El-Hamad & Al-Bargothi, 2010; Hroub, 2000). As a result, it managed to open several 
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offices in some Arab and Islamic countries. International interest in Hamas, and from the Americans in particular, 
increased after the Israeli deported 413 Hamas members and supporters to the Marj al-Zohour - in Arabic, 'field 
of flowers' - area in Lebanon in late 1992. Hamas then intensified its direct contacts with the ambassadors and 
diplomats of several Western countries, thus confirming its general foreign policies of openness to, and dialogue 
with, all countries and organizations abroad. 
After joining the Palestinian Government in 2007, it resumed its communications with some of the 
Europeans and then participated in many Islamic and Arab official meetings. Indeed, the Russian initiative to 
receive Hamas officials and held talks with the movement at the Russian foreign minister’s level reflected both 
sides’ desire to reinforce the connections amongst themselves (Al-Khazendar, 2009). In its first statement as a 
newly-formed Palestinian government, Hamas expressed the orientation of its foreign policy and its perspectives 
on the international institutions. It intended to move towards more involvement and openness in the region. 
Moreover, it seeks the attention of international community along with all of its institutions and international 
forces. They also emphasized the necessity of dialogue with the external environment and the rejection of all 
forms of political, intellectual, or cultural self-inflicted seclusion (Al-Khazendar, 2009). Ismail Haniyyah asserts 
that “the government’s assiduity in establishing healthy and strong relations with the various world countries as 
well as with the international institutions, including the United Nations and Security Council. According to what 
facilitates peace and world stability, we are engaged in a solid and strong relationship with the European Union, 
although we expect from it to reconsider some of its followed policies regarding the conflict in the region." “The 
Prime Minister's Speech to the Legislative Council to Gain the Confidence Motion for his Government” (Al-
Quds, 2007). 
According to Rizqa (2014), in evaluating position on internal and external politics from theory to 
practice, Hamas adopted flexible attitudes. Hamas took part in building many political alliances with both the 
secular and leftwing Palestinian factions who were against the occupation, the Oslo Accords, and Fatah’s 
monopoly on decision-making. Hamas’s practical conduct has prompted researchers to state that “Hamas has 
overcome the barrier of secularism in its alliances with others.” Some have explained this as duplicitous but, for 
Hamas, it was a legitimate tactic and was part of what was acceptable under the Shariah law, which 
accommodates supreme interests and priorities when interacting with reality. Hamas’s practical position can be 
attributed to three main reasons: The first reason is the overall political situation in Palestine, which focused on 
liberation over theoretical and ideological differences. The second reason is Hamas’s rising strength and clout. 
The third reason is the evolution of Hamas’s political ideology and its experience in power and in assuming 
public responsibilities. 
According to El-Hamad and Al-Bargothi (2010), in its various political activities, Hamas had shown a 
considerable amount of consistency with its principles. It should be noted also that Hamas used the Islamic 
doctrinal concept that can be translated as balancing the good and evil considerations or arranging preferences 
among various possibilities while still committing itself to its basic principles. In such an endeavor, Hamas had 
been able to strike a balance between Islamic principles and spirit on the one hand and contemporary political 
practices and techniques on the other. 
 
4. The Constraints and Political Challenges 
A functional structure made up Hamas’ landslide victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections on January 
2006 came as an unwelcome and unexpected shock to both Middle Eastern and international regimes (Scham & 
Abu-Irshaid, 2009). The victory of Hamas confounded the Fatah and Israel and affected the peace process as 
everyone involved attempted to control or topple Hamas (Saleh, 2014). The Hamas government was then faced 
with international and Israeli rejections, with Israel declaring it as a government that supports “terrorism.” The 
USA also announced that it will not deal with any Palestinian government that had not explicitly accepted the 
Quartet conditions (Abu-Helal, 2014; Zweiri, 2006). However, Hamas remained committed to its initial goals 
and demands, which included ending the Israeli occupation, maintaining an armed resistance, insisting on the 
right of return for Palestinian refugees, and establishing a Palestinian state “from the river to the sea” with 
Jerusalem as its capital. These goals contradicted the Quartet Principles, which required Hamas to recognize 
Israel, adhere to previous agreements, and renounce resistance in exchange for international recognition (Abu-
Helal, 2014; Lovlie and Knudsen, 2013; Zweiri, 2006). This resulted in the economic, political, and military 
pressures on Hamas (Abu-Helal, 2014). 
According to Haniyyah (2014), “When Hamas took part in the parliamentary elections, we were fully 
aware of the challenges that will face it because they come on the stage of a new type. What was expected has 
happened, and the siege began with the election results and the announcement of its intention to form a 
government motion, and the process to fail Hamas internally and externally. And it appears that there are those 
who did not accept these results and handed them a formality, but work on abortion and infanticide experience in 
the first few months, and some bet on the fall of the government after a period not exceeding three months.” 
Numerous efforts at reconciliation failed and attempts at forming a national unity government proved elusive. 
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Therefore, since the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004 and Hamas’ emergence as a plausible candidate for national 
leadership, Hamas was locked in an on-going rivalry for leadership with the PLO and PA, a situation that has 
sustained the national division until now (Hamdan, 2013; Brown, 2012). In short, the Fatah command, after 
around 40 years of monopolizing the leadership, was no longer used or wished to have a real transfer of power, 
particularly with sides that have opposing ideologies, strategies, and priorities like the Islamic movement (Saleh, 
2014).  
All the informants believed that the vision of Hamas on Palestinian national interest is completely 
different with the previous administration view, there has been opposed on the subject of the concept of the 
national interest that means "conflict of national interest". This was further stated by Saleh, (2014); Brown, 
( 2012) that, the Palestinian internal situation was, and still is, faced with two different visions and paths in 
dealing with the priorities and fundamentals of the national work. They have two different approaches to 
managing the struggle with Israel; resistance and peace settlement, and they have different ways in dealing with 
Arab and international states (Saleh, 2014; Brown, 2012) [see Fig.1]. Hence, it would not be fair to simplify the 
differences between Fatah and Hamas by saying that they were merely struggles for power. One cannot explain 
the steadfastness of Hamas in the face of the Israeli siege and aggression on the Gaza Strip, the shutting down of 
its institutions, the imprisonment of its PLC members, and the pursuit of its supporters in the West Bank, as 
being merely a wish to have a better position in power. On the other hand,  one cannot explain Fatah's 
persistence to see Hamas recognize the PLO agreements and form a government whose political program 
adheres to the PLO's program and the Quartet's conditions, except in the light of pushing Hamas towards a 
political program that includes the recognition of Israel and the relinquishment of most of occupied Palestine in 
1948  as well as the ceasing of resistance actions, which contradicts the principles of Hamas (Saleh, 2014; 
Hamdan, 2013). Hence, Hamas suffered from Fatah’s collaboration with the occupation in the West Bank to 
pursue and eradicate Hamas along with the mutual media and security campaigns against each other (Saleh, 
2014). 
Since the formation of the Hamas government in 2006, the government faced a strict international 
economic siege. The siege further increased after the Palestinian division in mid-June 2007 and that made the 
Gaza Strip become greatly dependent on smuggling activities through the tunnels on its borders with Egypt. The 
mechanism of the Rafah crossing operations and its opening days were part of the government’s daily problems 
(Felesteen, 2011) because these were influenced by the political and security developments in Egypt as well as 
Hamas-Egyptian relations. Hamas took over the functions of the government while it was suffering a severe 
financial crisis because of the siege (Abu-Helal, 2014). On the financial and economic levels, the international 
siege continued with some Arab aid being prevented from reaching the government’s treasury. Consequently, the 
drastic economic and financial situations reached unprecedented levels. Although some major Arab aids were 
then allowed, the holding tax funds by Israel, the delay in transferring the Arab and international aid, and the 
accumulation of financial crises suffered from the previous governments led to the swelling of the government’s 
debt owed to the private sector. Thus, the government failed to implement its projects, which resulted in delayed 
wages payment that led to labour strikes and work disruptions as well as a paralysis of the government’s key 
services (Al-Ayyam, 2007; Ma‘an, 2007). 
The Hamas government also faced several obstacles in addition to the usual ones faced by all the 
preceding governments, such as financial deficiency, Israeli practices and weak security control on the ground. 
However, this was the first government to be formed by the Hamas after Fatah monopolized the formation of 
previous Palestinian governments. Thus, the early period of this government witnessed a less than smooth 
transfer of power. The international economic and political siege imposed on the government when Hamas 
rejected the conditions imposed by the Quartet as well as Fatah cadres’ control of the high administrative 
positions in the PA institutions curtailed the ability of the Hamas government to implement its program in light 
of the differences between the ministers and their teams. The government started its work despite lacking funds 
and, in order to lift the international financial siege, agreed that the international aid be transferred to the 
presidency rather than the Ministry of Finance, thus depriving the government of an important power source. It 
was a very difficult mission under the international and regional sieges (Abu-Helal, 2014). 
Furthermore, the government faced additional burdens due to the Israeli battles on the Gaza Strip, 
especially Operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009, and sometimes it had to work under exceptional circumstances. 
For instance, some institutions had to work temporarily in tents after the shelling and destruction of their 
buildings (PIC, 2009). The Israeli battles also saw a large number of families lose their breadwinners and this 
further burdened the government with extra expenses as those families’ financial aids amounted to millions of 
dollars (Assabeel, 2010). Moreover, the blockade on the Gaza Strip prevented the speedy reconstruction of the 
buildings damaged from the Israeli battles. This matter was gravely compounded by the political differences 
between Fatah and Hamas as well as by the international siege that targeted some construction materials. 
Politically, the Hamas government faced international discrimination where its members faced many restrictions 
while Fatah and other independent members were allowed to visit international capitals and meet their 
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counterparts in different countries. Therefore, the government’s attempts to confirm its unity and reject 
discrimination failed to change this situation (Ma‘an, 2007).  
 
5. Palestinian National Interests: The Hamas Vision 
The Palestinian national interests remain one of the cardinal responsibilities of any government to protect. This 
objective aimed to explore how Hamas perceived the national interests of Palestine and how these national 
interests influenced its foreign policy at the international level. The current study found that the protection of the 
national rights of the Palestinians, namely the right of return and the right of liberating the land is central to 
Hamas regime. To substantiate this insight, almost all the respondents showed their commitment to it. For 
instance, informant C describes that the national interest is the interests of the land, people, and power. And any 
actions to liberate the land or any part thereof, and everything to achieve the Palestinian right of returning to the 
homeland, are located in the political circle of Hamas's national interest vision, (Informant, C). This is in line 
with the previous observations by Abu-Helal (2014) and Mish’al 2012). 
In the related flow of ideas, informant A stresses that national interests remained one of the main paths 
that the Hamas movement used to achieve the political and economic objectives. The respondent described that, 
from the Hamas point of view the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, the ultimate aim. Interestingly, the 
informant B seemed to extend the scope of the description regarding this topic. The shared point was that it is in 
Hamas’ interests that Palestinian factions to unite peacefully without disputes and internal conflicts. The 
communications between Fatah and Hamas are continuous and have on several occasions reached an 
understanding to end all forms of internal violence, (Informant, B). 
Taken together, these findings from these three respondents underline the central idea of Hamas that the 
attainments of the national interest of the Palestinians should not be compromised. This is the main gate to reach 
a formula and a national project that tends to meet all the political forces and handles all the conflicts with the 
occupation. These findings match those observed in earlier studies that the Palestinian national interest should be 
given much attention (Saleh, 2014; Abu-Helal, 2014). In this respect, no wonder that Hamas is consistent to 
work with political strategies to fit the fluctuating realities in order to fit the desires of the Palestinians. In fair 
description it is not difficult from the findings to note that the life lived experiences of Hamas and its supports 
are far from the suspicious distortion of many writers against the essence of the attaining the agenda of the 
Hamas.  
From this description, one could see the hard work of love, commitments and passions that Hamas has 
succeeded to share with Palestinians. From this understanding it can simply reads that talking about the 
Palestinian national interest is equal to the defense of the interests of the Palestinian people. This finding has an 
important implication to our understanding that Hamas is aware with the Palestinian peoples’ interests both at 
the national and international levels. From such level of awareness, Hamas believes that Palestinian interests 
ultimately are the things of the valuable importance that count. These findings confirm earlier findings by(Saleh, 
2014; Hamdan, 2013) that Hamas has its clear mission consistent to the desires of the Palestinians. 
The paper found that Hamas’ vision on Palestine’s national interests was based on the interests of the 
Palestinians, which cantered on their fundamental rights and the right to claim their land that has been occupied 
by the Zionist. On this note, understanding the foreign policy of Hamas can never be overemphasized without 
understanding their vision on the Palestinians’ national interests. This is because Hamas is a political movement 
established to protect the Palestinian national interests.  
For Hamas Palestinian national interest means free from occupation, resistance and external domination 
and this statement can be found in the Hamas Charter (Charter, 1988). For example, Article 11 declares that 
Hamas honours Nationalism (Wataniyya) as part of the religious duties. Nothing is deeper in nationalism than 
waging jihad against the enemy and opposing them when they set foot on the land of the Muslims. Also, Article 
10 of the Charter states that the Islamic Resistance Movement, while charting its own course, will do its utmost 
best to constitute support to the weak and defend all the oppressed simultaneously. Muslih (1999) adds that even 
though the movement seems aspiring on the ideological level to Islamic principles, it also derived its strength 
from specific contexts of the Palestinian nationalism. The findings also confirmed previous observations by Abu-
Helal (2014) and Mish’al (2012) that the national interests in Hamas’ vision were anything. This is the 
considerable level of awareness that is shared by this respondent. One meaning is that Hamas is aware of its 
context and its readiness to capitalize on available opportunities to provide extensive community services and 
responding to the political reality consistent to the expectation of Palestinian cannot be compromised.  
In a study by Bondokji (2013), Hamas was shown to have become the main Palestinian actor when it 
won the Palestinian democratic legislative elections in 2006 and, in recent years, went from holding a religious 
ideology to becoming a nationalist movement that focused on national rights. Another study by Hroub (2005) 
reports that Hamas’ traditional projections of itself as an uncompromising resistance movement the popularity is 
derived from its resistance to the Israeli occupation. This is in addition to strengthening and defending the 
Palestinian national unity among other priorities of its national interest. Objectively, it can be reasoned that there 
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is a distinct difference between how Hamas whose core interests is that of capitalizing on available opportunities 
to protect Palestinian national interests and how the critics who are blind and do not hold this conviction writes 
about this movement. However, its vision of the national interests differed from Fatah’s stance in the sense that 
Hamas focused on the Umma (people) first before any other things (Alshaer, 2009; Tamimi, 2007; Halliday, 
2002) while Fatah considered its party manifest as the main focus (Deane, 2009). 
 
6. The Main Principles of Hamas Foreign Policy 
Therefore, any government, party, or movement has its certain regularities that guide its existence. Although 
these principles vary from one government to another, most of them do have principles (Levitt, 2008). In regards 
to the principle of Hamas that shape and determine the regime’s foreign policy, and from the information 
obtained from the informants, the paper finds that the real principle of Hamas is derived from the Islam religion 
based on the Qur’an and Sunnah, where anything apart from these Islamic principles were considered partially in 
the movement’s action. The movement identified the following as the major principles in pursuing and 
protecting the national interest of the Palestinians and its foreign policy objectives [see Fig.2]:  
 
6.1 Islamic Ethics and Controls 
Islamic values and principles were the main ethics of the movement and its tenets were based on the teachings of 
the Qur’an and Sunnah in guiding its political and economic activities. Informant E views Islamic ethics and 
precepts of the Hamas movement as follows: 
Hamas, in all its political performance, remained based on the ethics and Islamic tenets that 
govern the movement’s performance and its relations, and the movement succeeded in carving a 
new experience in the construction and management of its political relations, dealing in reality 
with all its components, and with the needs of the political work and its details (Informant, E). 
Similarly, another informant is of the opinion that the principles of Hamas depended on the Islamic ideologies 
and objectives of the movement: 
Hamas is constantly associated as an Islamist movement that takes the Islamic doctrine, behavior 
and way of life as the mind of the movement and, therefore, jihad is the line and basic right for 
her for the Liberation of Palestine. Hamas understands that political performance is at the origin 
of the idea of serving the people, unless it is opposed by the Sharia. I prefer the term high 
dynamic than pragmatic to document the reality of this focus, (Informant, D). 
Based on these two respondents it is obvious that faith on Islamic views of ethics is something that cannot be 
negotiated. One meaning is that, throughout the course of the Hamas practices, the necessity of realizing its 
political and economic activities is done without being so contradictory or inconsistent with the system value of 
Islamic ethics and precepts. Quite understandably, this finding communicate intellectual and spiritual paradigm 
shift, contrary to what the critics attempts to mislead. 
 
6.2 The Strategic Visions 
This is another principle established and adopted by the Hamas government in achieving the national interests 
and foreign policy. It includes the strategic political, economic and military plans, which address the 
movement’s goal. For instance, one of the informants notes that Hamas had a clear vision on its strategies and 
goals: “Hamas movement’s relations are based on a strategic vision for political action with clear goals progress 
and strategic, which are derived from the liberalization strategy”. Other informant A viewed that: “Military 
struggle and smart diplomacy are two essential aspects of a sound Palestinian strategy and Hamas used to have 
strong strategic relations”. 
In light of the fulfilment of a clear strategic vision and support of the liberation, the findings show that 
Hamas had a set of principles in its domestic and international relations too. The focus behind is to serve its 
strategy. For instance, informant D explained: “The movement has a strategic vision as a principle because the 
overriding goal is to get rid of the occupation. In an extended version respondent E shared the experience that 
shows Hamas ability to work with the government and other institutions in protecting the interest of the people. 
The respondent E shared that it is important to note that aside the main principle Hamas portrays the ability to 
maintain cardinal relations. He perceives that Hamas practiced the principle of maintaining relationships within 
the Palestine institutions: It is encouraging to note that the said Hamas’s policy principle is aware of the 
importance of having good relationship from the grassroots. The key point here is that what is required for the 
successful movement is among other things to do more. In another development, informant B further emphasised 
that strengthening and expansions were also part of Hamas’ policies. This means that Hamas is also aware with 
the need to expand its policies in order to win support of other countries in the context of external political 
relations. This respondent shared that: “Although the results of the Russia visit were positive and we achieved 
our goals in terms of penetrating the international arena through a major country and a member of the UN 
Security Council, Russia is also a member of the Quartet and has a long history in the region”. One meaning is 
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that in realizing its broad goal, a movement leaders as for its supporters are duty bound to demonstrate strategic 
tractability in the organizational approach to governance. Elsewhere, Respondent D puts that: “Hamas has 
opened doors and gates to Turkey and the Gulf states, received in Egypt, and likewise visited Iran and went to 
Russia”. These findings have important implication to our understanding of the centrality to the sense of 
togetherness as shared by Palestinians in the midst of the present challenging moments. From the said views a 
point can be made that people needs organizational or movements’ policy that encourage both leaders and 
followers to look up to working with others without compromising the key goals. One reason of this kind of 
thinking can probably be related to the extra ordinary quality of leaders to have great vision and being active in 
implementing the said version. It can be reasoned that competence and dedication are required both in theory and 
practice of the movement. 
 
6.3 The Independence of Decisions 
Decisions in Hamas were very important and independent with regards to its political activities and, in order to 
achieve political and economic sphere for its people, Hamas preserved its tradition and maintained its principle 
of not joining any groups or parties. Informant E is of the notion that in the context of the political relations, the 
movement has always been keen on the independence of its decision despite belonging to the nation, with the 
affiliation of the nation, and rejects any dependency on any of the other political relations. Accordingly, 
informant A adds that it is the movement’s independence and the decision not to allow the intervention of states 
to influence its decisions either in convergence or divergence with States but to the extent of supporting, and 
assigning to, the cause of the Palestinian people.The description here is that when Israel asked Fatah to put 
pressure on Hamas, Hamas retaliated by going against the Israeli occupation as Hamas’ principle was that 
Palestinian blood is a red line [See Fig.3]. Informant D also commented that: “Hamas responds to pressure 
situations in accordance with the estimated interests of that particular circumstance”. 
 
6.4 Supporting of the Resistance 
Towards Resisting the occupation became one of the foremost major principles of Hamas and the Palestinians in 
defending their homeland, culture, politics, and socio-economic activities from external dominations. The 
Palestinians believe that the only means to fight against their enemy or any other external domination or 
occupation is by resistance. The Palestinians view the Zionist as their number one enemy that causes them 
suffering in present days, and the only way to prevent that is through resistance as stated by informant E “…the 
only enemy of the Palestinian people and the forces of resistance, including Hamas, is the Zionist entity that 
stems animosity towards it from occupying Palestinian lands and usurping the rights of the Palestinian people. 
Hamas, therefore, has no problem in dealing with any regional or international parties, except for the A party, 
who occupied Palestinian territories, destroyed Palestinian lives and displaced Palestinian refugees, (Informant, 
E). 
However, it is important to note that based on the views of informant E, the struggle against the 
occupation through armed resistance remained the only means in achieving the political ends. Hamas has been 
true to its principles and true to the resistance and there is no change in its permanent positions (i.e. non-
recognition of Israel's right to exist)…The basic guidelines of the Hamas government do not contradict the 
principles of the Palestinian people and the resistance is even the main element in those basic guidelines. As far 
as we're concerned, the issue of recognizing Israel has been settled once and for all. It has been settled in our 
political literature, in our Islamic thoughts and in our Jihadist cultures, on which we based our moves. 
Recognition of Israel is out of the question. We have been advocating the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital, and the return of the refugees. In 
exchange for all that, we will declare a truce but no recognition of Israel. We will never recognize the usurper 
Zionist government and will continue our jihad-like movement until the liberation of Jerusalem, (Informant, B). 
Consequently, Hamas electoral platform document of the Change and Reform (2007), which indicates 
that, “we have to exploit all our energy to support the resistance of our people and to provide all abilities to end 
occupation and establishing the Palestinian state whose Jerusalem is its capital” also Hamas Charter Article 
No.15 states that “the jihad to liberate ‘Palestine’ is the personal duty of every Muslim". This articles has shown 
the commitment made by Hamas in providing solution the Palestinians problem through different means. It is 
base on this that, Rudolph and Van Engeland (2013), stated that one of Hamas domestic policies is unity through 
dialogue which is the only accepted way to solve domestic disputes, and prohibiting internecine violence as 
Palestinian blood prohibited. 
 
6.5 Protecting the Interests 
The word interest connotes the desire of achieving a particular thing within a specified period. Interests in the 
dimension of Hamas principle depicted the clear objectives of the movement put in place to be achieved. 
Informant E argues that the fundamental interests in Hamas's political relations are always based on the interests 
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of the Palestinian people and their cause, and regardless of the nature of the available political relations and 
opportunities that may sometimes seem attractive. Therefore, Hamas's political relations do not interfere with, or 
adversely affect, the national interests of the Palestinian people and their cause, (Informant, E). Informant A also 
states that the interest of the movement was to establish a strong government by forming a coalition cabinet to 
protect the Palestinian national interests.Consequently, from the previous quotations, it could be interpreted that 
Hamas viewed the Palestinian rights as the basic and most fundamentals before any other things. As such, the 
principle of “openness on the basis of supporting the Palestinian national rights” was given much priority than 
any other matter because Palestinians, like any other human beings on earth, deserve their rights and this point of 
view remained as the protected national interest. 
For its part, the Palestinian government and the Palestinian factions in Gaza Strip affirmed their support 
for the right of the Palestinian people to express their devotion to the right of return with all possible means. This 
was essentially executed on the ground where ministers, deputies in the Palestinian Legislative Council and 
leaders of all factions in the Gaza Strip were at the forefront of the marches which headed to the borders with 
Palestine occupied in 1948. This position is based on these forces’ belief in the need to build on the popular 
movements and the “Arab uprisings” to launch Palestinian popular events. These events would be a way for the 
Palestinians’ right to take control, declare their adherence to the right of return and insist on achieving it. 
The prisoner exchange deal (the Faithfulness of Freemen Deal) is deliberated a great national 
accomplishment; in spite of the fact that it did not fulfil all of Hamas’ conditions and demands. However, it 
succeeded in raising Hamas’ reputation in that it is considered once again a crucial party in the Palestinian arena. 
Therefore, such is vital to deal with it as a tough player that has influence on shaping the general path of the 
Palestinian issue. In spite of the significance of the above, the direct merit of the deal is that it owes its success to 
armed resistance. The prisoner exchange was an offspring of the resistance and a product of its sacrifices. 
Therefore, the Palestinian people who came out in the middle of March 2011 and said: ‘the people want to 
liberate the prisoners’ were as if placing their ballot papers in the armed resistance boxes. They considered the 
resistance their only credible path, able to achieve the task of freeing the prisoners and detainees, especially 
those serving long sentences and are the Palestinian factions’ leaders and cadres, the elite of the Palestinian 
people. Continuing from this fact, we can say that the choice of armed resistance is once again weakly at the 
forefront. The people are rallying round it since it has assumed a nationalistic strategy. What heightened this 
result is the failure of the peace settlement talks to free detainees, and the prisoners specially the leaders and 
cadres serving long sentences. The exchange deal has once again declared two essential matters about Hamas: 
first, that it is a key in persuading events in the political arena and in managing the national path. While the 
second, the legitimacy of armed resistance in any impending national working program. 
 
6.6 Non-Interference 
Non-inteference is part of Hamas’ principles. “The Movement is committed to the policy of non-interference in 
the internal affairs of States under any circumstance,” (Informant, E). The first thing to understand here is that, in 
order for the movement to act at the international level, the movement must choose to be neutral and position 
itself as a non-interfering group: Non-interference in the affairs of states, whatsoever the reason may be, and 
maintaining the movement’s independence by not allowing the intervention of states to influence its decisions, 
either in convergence or divergence with the States, are on the extent of supporting and assigning the cause of 
the Palestinian people, (Informant, A). 
More so, most of the informants responded that Hamas had succeeded in building relations with the 
countries of the region that it contributed to the growth in political presence. Through such relations, Hamas 
presented a positive image of political reliability and independence and managed to cope with some political and 
security crises with some of these countries. This finding was in line with Al-Khazendar (2009); Harub (2000) 
that Hamas has succeeded in becoming a main actor in the regional and international political actions towards 
the region. Furthermore, the movement succeeded in presenting both clear “vision and strategic policies”.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The main goal of the current study was to explore foreign policy of the Hamas Palestinian government. One of 
the more significant findings from this study is related to Hamas’ ideology and principle of nationalism being the 
top secret of its success at the international level. This paper has argued that Hamas is a movement that struggles 
to protect the right and interest of Palestine’s citizens at the international level. It was also shown that the 
principles of Hamas support and protect Palestinian’s national interests. The most obvious finding to emerge 
from this study is that resistance against occupation by the Zionist through liberation remained as the only means 
towards the desired self-national interests. Taken together, the evidences from this study suggest that Hamas is 
adamant to non-recognition of the Zionist occupation and the Quartet agreement’s conditions. 
The paper found that the Hamas perceived the Palestinians’ national interest as the liberation of the land 
through the adoption of arm resistance. Hence, Hamas played a more significant role in protecting Palestine’s 
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national interest than their rival party Fatah because Fatah had completely lost the aim of Palestine’s national 
interest (Friedman, 2008). This gave an upper hand to Hamas to rule and control the PLO. 
The principles of Hamas supported and protected the Palestinian’s national interests. This was clearly 
evident in its principle of strength and expansion of communal relations to serve the Palestinian cause and 
sincerity in supporting the Palestinian national rights. On the issue of resistance against the occupation, it 
appeared from the analysis of Hamas’ foreign policy that resistance remained the only means to resist the 
occupation though it was one of the several approaches for liberation. This arose in the context of Hamas 
steadfastly confirming their non-recognition of the occupation and the Quartet agreement’s conditions that lent 
legitimacy to the Israeli occupation. 
From the views put forward from previous studies and findings of this paper, all have directed to the 
same inferences. This means that the results found in this study are similar to the speech of the leader of Hamas, 
the government electoral platform, and even the Hamas Charter since 1987 to date, as nothing has changed in the 
political thought and practice of Hamas. This further validates the result of this study and concurrently 
substantiates the findings of the paper as solid and important so as to reflect the Hamas movement’s power. 
These findings are consistent with those of other studies and suggest that Hamas as serious movement to sustain 
and protect Palestinian interests has taken into account the centrality of sound strategic analysis in realizing its 
goals. Precisely, both respondents seem to express the same fundamental truth of what is Hamas in its 
comprehensive model of operation. The findings further support previous studies and reviewed works (Abu-
Helal, 2014; Lovlie and Knudsen, 2013; Zweiri, 2006).  
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Figure 1. Two different visions and paths (resistance and peace settlement) 
(Source: Al-Quds, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 2. The Main Principles of Hamas Foreign Policy 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Triangle Base in Hamas Response 
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